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Anti-trust Laws-Robinson-Patman Act-Price Discrimination-
Proportionally Equal Terms
In 1936, Congress enacted the Robinson-Patman Act' in an endeavor
to plug the holes in the anti-trust dike concerning price discrimination. 2
Some observers seemed confident at the time the Act was passed that
its "intent" was clear.3 H6wever, subsequent events have revealed
many ambiguities. One writer has been prompted to remark that
"There is a law suit in literally every word of it."
'4
The phrase "proportionally equal terms," in subsections (d) and
(e), 5 has been characterized as a "legislative monstrosity" because of
its ambiguities. The source of the trouble is that these sections purport
to prescribe a standard for determining what constitutes equality in the
granting of services or facilities but no actual standard is given. The
payments or services must be made to different purchasers on "propor-
tionally equal terms." The Federal Trade Commission has been given
wide latitude to determine what constitutes "proportionally equal terms."
This "blank check" has left the Act without a definite standard and has
149 STAT. 1526 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (Supp. 1952).'An excellent discussion of the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act
may be found in: Evans, Anti-Price Discrimination Act of 1936, 23 VA. L. Ray.
140 (1936) ; NoEs, 36 COL. L. Rxv. 1285 (1936) ; 50 HARV. L. Rav. 106 (1936).
'Mr. Commissioner Ayres, Chairman of the Commission in 1937, said of the
new legislation: "I do not contend that the Act is without imperfections, but I do
believe that any business man who desires and conscientiously endeavors to keep
within its provisions will have little trouble in doing so. Its purpose and intent are
clear." NoRwooD, TRADE PRACTICE AND PRoCEDuRE LAW (1938).
'GORDON, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ANTI-DIs-
CRIMINATION ACT, p. 21 (1936). Some Senators were confused as to its purport.
80 CONG. REc. 6429 (1936). But see note 11, infra.
549 STAT. 1526 (1938), 15 U. S. C. §13 (Supp. 1952):
Subsection (d) : "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to
pay or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a
customer of such person in the course of such commerce as compensation or in
consideration for any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer
in connection with the processing, handling, sale or offering for sale by such person,
unless such payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to
all other customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities."
Subsection (e) : "It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of
one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for
resale, with or without processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by
contributing to the furnishing of, any services or facilities connected with the
processing, handling, sale or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon
terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms." [Italics added.].
Oppenheim, Should the Robinson-Patman Act Be Amendedf CCH ROBINsO)N-
PATMAN AcT SYmPosium 141, 146 (1948). At the Conference Proceedings on
the Robinson-Patman Act held in New York on July 8, 1936, Mr. Gordon stated:
"The only definite thing about the phrase ... is that it is indefinite."
NOTES AND COMMENT
led to attacks in the courts. But so far these provisions have withstood
assault.7 The purpose of this note is to inquire into the possible ratios
which may come within the purview of "proportionally equal terms."
In the case of Elizabeth Arden Sales Corporation v. Gus Blass,8 the
appellant advanced, in theory, the ratio of "dollar volume of purchases
made." Had the figures of the appellant been correct 0 and the allow-
ances offered to each of the companies graduated to shift throughout
I Subsection (e) was attacked on the ground of being unconstitutional in Eliza-
beth Arden, Inc., v. Federal Trade Commission, 156 F. 2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 331 U. S. 806. The Court of Appeals, in ruling against the petitioner,
stated: "We reject the contention that the standard in section (e) is so indefinite
that men of common intelligence cannot adequately grasp its meaning and therefore
it is invalid as an improper delegation of legislative power and violative of due
process.!
8 150 F. 2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 773. Here appellant, a
Delaware corporation, was the distributing and sales company of Eliabzeth Arden,
Inc., a manufacturer of cosmetics. Appellee owned and operated a department store
in Little Rock, Ark., said store containing a cosmetic and toilet-goods department. In
1938 appellee, via an oral contract with appellant, began to carry the Elizabeth
Arden line of products. It was agreed that appellant would pay one half of the
salary of a "demonstrator" in appellee's store amounting to $10 per week, said
"demonstrator" to push the sales of Elizabeth Arden products when it was possible
to do so. At other times this "demonstrator" was to wait on the general trade.
This arrangement remained in effect for two years at which time the appellant
discontinued selling Elizabeth Arden cosmetics to the appellee and in lieu of the
appellee, the appellant began selling to the M. M. Cohn Co., another department
store in Little Rock, Ark., and a competitor of appellee. The Cohn Co. had been
handling Elizabeth Arden cosmetics during the period that the appellee handled
them and the appellee knew of this. However, the appellant failed to disclose to
the appellee that he (appellant) had been paying all of the salary of the "demon-
strator" for the M. M. Cohn Co., a total of $20 per week. Appellee seeks to recover
three fold the difference between the amount of the allowances made and the value
of the services furnished to Cohn and those to the appellee. The trial court had
held in favor of the appellee for $10 per week for 101 weeks or an aggregate of
$1,010.00.
1 Appellant seeks to substantiate his case by stating, in the language of the court
that ". . . taking the total amount of products purchased by Cohn Co. over the
entire period involved, in the sum of $18,593.40, and the total amount purchased
by the appellee, in the sum of $11,250.35, then deducting the amount of goods, in
the sum of $2,463.04, which Cohn Co. took off appellee's hands . . .and finally
comparing the net figure of $8,787.51 for appellee with the figure of $18,593.40 for
Cohn Co.," there is a ratio of proportionality set up as the dollar volume purchased
by each of the two companies. Converting his dollar volume purchased into per-
centages, appellant contends that since Cohn Co. did more than 67% of the business
and appellee received much more than a proportionate share of the salary, i.e. 50%
instead of 33%', appellant is in the clear and the appellee is in no position to contend
that he has been slighted or a violation of the law has occurred.
10 However, the court found a number of fallacies in the appellant's argument,
including some discrepancies in appellant's figures. They stated: ". . . In the next
place appellant's retrospective effort to adopt appellee's entire purchasing period as
the base for testing the question of proportional treatment in relation to the amount
of goods bought is purely artificial, for the evidence does not show that its policy
of furnishing clerk's services or paying clerk's salaries ever was related to such a
base. In passing, it may also be noted that, if appellant had undertaken to make
a comparison of purchases by a calender year, appellee's purchases for the period
that it handled appellant's products in 1938 would have shown $5,117.78 as against
$3,834,83 for Cohn Co., and if a fiscal year had been taken commencing with the
date that appellee began handling appellant's products it would have shown pur-
chases of $7,086.86 by appellee during that specific period ls against $7,575.82 by
Cohn Co."
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the business relationship so as to mirror their true value, the Commis-
sion probably would have upheld appellant's contention." However,
in reality, the appellant's facts indicate that the ratio which he in fact
advanced was one of his own discretion and favor. This was rejected
as being merely an arbitrary arrangement. The court stated: "That
which was discriminatory under the statute when done, cannot subse-
quently, in order to enable the seller to escape damages the discrimina-
tion, be artificially tailored into proportionally equal terms by fitting it
to some imaginary basis or standard that has never in fact existed."'
2
Even though the court does not go into all the ramifications of "pro-
portionally equal terms," it does infer that the proportionality must have
a sound basis of existence, not a mere arbitrary arrangement, and such
basis must have its birth not later than co-existent with the furnishing
of the service or facility.
"The Court approved the Commission's cease and desist order which stated:
"The statute affords the seller a free election in the first instance as to what services
or facilities, if any, he will provide to purchasers of his products; but having elected
to furnish a particular service or facility to a particular purchaser or puchasers, he
thereby assumes the obligation of according similar services to all competing pur-
chasers to the extent required by the statute. The furnishing of a service or fa-
cility which cannot be proportionalized for the benefit of competing purchasers, or,
in the alternative, the failure or-refusal to proportionalize the terms upon which
services or facilities are granted, so as to make it reasonably possible for com-
peting purchasers to avail themselves of such services or facilities if they desire to
do so, constitutes a failure to accord such services or facilities upon proportionally
equal terms."
Both the Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, explaining
the meaning of "proportionally equal terms," concurred: "Where a competitor can
furnish them (i.e., services or facilities) in less quantity but of the same relative
value, he seems entitled, and this clause is designed to accord him, the right to a
similar allowance commensurate with those facilities. To illustrate: Where, as
was revealed in the hearings . . . . a manufacturer grants to a particular chain
distributor as advertising allowance of a stated amount per month per store in
which the former's goods are sold, a competing customer with a smaller number
of stores, but equally able io furnish the same service per store, and under condi-
tions of the same value to the seller, would be entitled to a similar allowance on
that basis." SEN. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) ; H. R. REP. No. 2287,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
Furthermore, Senator Logan, who was in charge of the bill on the floor of the
Senate, stated: "But if the seller grants an advertising allowance to one customer
there is no reason why he should not grant, under identical circumstances, the
same allowance to another customer based upon the quantity of the purchases. If
one man buys $100,000 in goods and should be allowed $1,000 for advertising pur-
poses, and another buys $10,000 in goods, he ought to be allowed $100 for adver-
tising. That is not prohibited by the bill. So long as the same advertising allow-
ances are made proportionately on the amount of purchases there is no prohibition
in the bill against them." 80th CoxG. Rwc. 3231 (1936). Congressman Utterback,
who was in charge of the bill on the floor of the House stated: "But proportional
to what? Proportional naturally to those customers' purchases and to their ability
and equipment to render or furnish the service or facilities to be paid for." 80th
CONG. REc. 9558 (1936). This would seem to be an indorsement of both the instant
ratio," Dollar Volu-me Purchased" and also "Quantity Purchased Ratio," which
will be discussed later.
1 150 F. 2d 988, 994 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 773 (1945).
[Vol. 32
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However, the "dollar volume purchased ratio"' 3 is not, as a matter
of law, the only basis upon which allowances or facilities may be
tendered.
Another possible ratio may be found in quantities purchased. A re-
cent survey by the American Law Institute stated: ". . . merchandising
payments and services may be considered granted on proportionally
equal terms when the payments are made or the services furnished in
proportion to the respective quantities of goods purchased by different
purchasers."' 4 Thus, if A sold B 100 car loads of potatoes and gave B
$100 to use for advertising for the sale of the potatoes, C, a competitor
of B, who bought 50 car loads of potatoes, would be entitled to $50 for
use in advertising the potatoes.15
Still another method of equalizing payments or services in a logically
valid ratio is by making such payments or services in proportion to
specified services furnished by the buyers without relation to the volume
of goods purchased, either dollar volume or volume purchased.' 6 For
13 Laton, "Demonstrators on Proportionally Equal Terms," CCH Robinson-
Patman Act Symposium, 38, 44 (1948).
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corporation v. Gus Blass, 150 F. 2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 326 U. S. 773; accord, Elizabeth Arden, Inc., v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, 156 F. 2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U. S. 806. In the last case
cited, petitioner sought to have the court review an order by the Federal Trade
Commission holding a violation of 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimi-
nation Act. The facts were that petitioner sold a "prestige" line of cosmetics in
the several states to stores judged by petitioner to have facilities and appropriate
services to merchandise the cosmetics in such a way which would appeal to cus-
tomers having exclusiveness and fashion as buying motives. To their more im-
portant stores, which constituted less than 10% of the total number of stores, peti-
tioners furnished "demonstrator" service, paying all or part of the salary to such
"demonstrators." To the remaining 90% of their customers, who bought some
60% of petitioner's total sales, no "demonstrator" service was given. The terms
vhich kept the 90% from being accorded this service were their inability to "'co-
operate! satisfactorily with petitioners by reciprocally furnishing to them . ..
services and facilities to promote the resale of Arden cosmetics, such as carrying
a representative stock, making available counter-displays, advertising once or twice
a month ... etc." The evidence tended to show that where the "demonstrators'
were furnished, the sales of the Arden line of cosmetics increased, "sometimes as
much as tripled." Upon this evidence, the Commission found that petitioners had
violated the Act, since the subsection "required a seller who elected to furnish any
service or facility to any purchaser to proportion both service or facility and terms
so as not to exclude any competitive purchaser." In upholding the Commission, the
court refused to read the limitation of an injurious effect upon competition of sub-
section (a) into subsection (e). Thus, subsection (e) is construed to be a per se
violation, as is subsection (d), the only defense being a flat denial of the charge.
In the instant case, petitioner tried unsuccessfully to use subjective considerations
such as prestige value of the displays, etc. as a basis for proportioning the "demon-
strators." The court rejected this as being much too arbitrary.
" AUSTIN, PRicE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBIN-
SON-PATM1AN Acv, 132 (1950).
"3 Although there have been no court decisions holding the "Quantity Purchased
Ratio" to be a valid standard, this would seem to follow from Congressman Utter-
back's statement, note 11, supra. It is contended that not only should $50 be avail-
able for C's use in advertising A's potatoes but also an alternative, that is a $50
equivalent in value. See notes 20 and 23, infra.
" Feldman & Zorn, "Advertising and Promotional Allowances," Bureau of
National Affairs (1948).
1954]
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example, A agrees to pay B at the rate of $10 per week per square foot
of window space for a maximum of 10 square feet for the exclusive
display of A's product for a period not to exceed four weeks. Therefore,
B receives $100 per week or $400 for the four week period. Now, sup-
pose C, a competitor of B, has only five square feet of window space. If C
agrees to display A's goods for two weeks, under this ratio C will be
entitled to $50 per week or $100 for the two weeks. But, even so, C is
still receiving the payments from A at the same rate of $10 per square
foot for four weeks, i.e., the same rate as that of B.
A similar situation would arise under the instant ratio if S, Seller,
agreed to pay B, Buyer, for specified local advertising of S's product a
sum not to exceed $100 per week which is to be 50% of the Buyer's cost
of such advertising for a maximum of four weeks. If X, a competitor
of B and a purchaser from S, had the same agreement with S and wished
to advertise for only two weeks and to buy local advertising at a total
cost of $100 per week, S under this agreement would pay $50 for each
of the two weeks. Thus, S is paying the 50% of the local advertising of
each buyer, both B and X, in proportion to the reciprocal advertising
service expense incurred by the buyers.
Conceding the above ratios to be proportional, there is still a strict
requirement which must be complied with. The reciprocal services or
facilities required of the purchasers for participation in the plan must
be within the ability of the smallest competing purchasers to furnish.
As the Commission stated in its findings in the Elizabeth Arden case:17
"The furnishing of a service or facility which cannot be proportionalized
for the benefit of competing purchasers or, in the alternative, the failure
or refusal to proportionalize the terms upon which services or facilities
are granted, so as to make it reasonably possible for competing pur-
chasers to avail themselves of such services or facilities if they desire to
do so, constitutes a failure to accord such services or facilities upon
proportionally equal terms. The phrase 'upon terms not accorded to
all purchasers on proportionally equal terms' contemplates the propor-
tionalization of the terms, and this necessarily includes the proportionali-
zation of the service or facility as well."
It is nowhere stated in subsection (d)' s that the payments made to
competing customers for services in return must be for services of the
same type. Nor does subsection (e) 19 provide that services furnished
to all purchasers must be of the same type. Thus, it has been stated:
"The way is left open to offer alternative terms to smaller purchasers
to suit their abilities, or alternative services to suit their needs." 20 This
1739 F. T. C. 288, 302 (1944).
"8 See note 5, supra. 10 See note 5, spra.
20 "For example, a manufacturer who has arranged with certain large purchasers
to pay all or a part of the cost of their newspaper and radio advertising, might
meet the 'proportionally equal terms,' requirement by offering payments to smaller
purchasers for providing window displays, distributing handbills, etc. If the co-
[Vol. 32
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would seem to be only conjecture, however, since the courts have not
read into the provision such a liberal interpretation. Even so, it would
seem logical as well as practical since, if a company agreed to paint
delivery trucks with the name of their product inscribed thereon for
use by a distributor, without such a liberal interpretation, the company
would be supposed to furnish identical services to other distributors who
made no use of trucks whatsoever.
However, the Federal Trade Commission, dividing 3-2, has attempted
to alleviate the situation in the Cosmetic Industry.2 In 1951 the Com-
mission issued certain rules for the Cosmetic Industry. One in particu-
lar was aimed at solving the problem of offering demonstrator services
by the manufacturers of cosmetics to all retail members of the industry
on terms of equality.22  The majority of the Commission realized that
too liberal an interpretation of the proportioning of demonstrator services
would lead to obvious absurdities. 23 The dissent contended that the
statute furnished no basis for any provision concerning alternative types
of promotional services. It seems clear that expediency and practical
necessity have emerged the victor over mere form and, therefore, the
rule as now promulgated is that where the demonstrator service is not
suitable to the facilities of one particular customer-24purchaser,25 an
operative merchandising services which the seller requires of large customers are
of a type which small customers cannot furnish, the terms offered should provide
for proportional benefits to the latter conditioned on the furnishing of alternative
services within their ability to render." AUSTIN, PaiCE DIScRIMSINArON AND RE-
LATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATmAN Acr 136 (1950).
21 F. T. C. Trade Practice Rules for the Cosmetic and Toilet Preparation Indus-
try, 16 Fed. Reg. 11,993 (1951), 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (9th ed.) 120,282 (1951).
. These rules, called "Group I" rules, set out those things which the Federal
Trade Commission consider to be illegal within the industry as distinguished from
"Group II" rules which merely set out those practices that are undesirable Within
the industry. Thus. "'Group r Trade Practice Rules merely express the under-
standing of the F. T. C. as to what conduct is illegal under the statutes within its
jurisdiction, in an endeavor to secure voluntary compliance and avoid individual
cease-and-desist proceedings." 65 HARv. L. Rv. 1261, 1262 (1952).
It is to be noted that these Trade Practice Rules must be viewed principally as
the weather forecast of "administrative wind" that the F. T. C. intends to follow
and not a reliable statement of existing law. That this latter statement is true is
evident from the fact that these rules do not grant immunity from prosecution but
they do help the industry form policies.
22 "As an example of eventual absurdity, if a girl demonstrator were employed
in a department store, it might be contended that the law .would be violated unless
proportionate services of the same girl would be provided for every small drug store
within range of that competition. And then, to continue on this road toward ab-
surdity, we might have to find some means of measuring the energy and enthusiasm
of the girl when she worked for a department store, as compared with when she
worked for a drug store. . . .Absurdities could be piled upon absurdities, if it
were necessary to prove that any such interpretation of the law was not intended
by the Congress." ANNUAL SuRVEy OF AmERIcAN LAW, 291 (1952).
"4 See note 7, supra. "It shall be unlawful... unless such payment or considera-
tion is available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers .. ." § 13(d).
(Italics added.)
2" See note 7, supra. "It shall be unlawful . .. or offering for sale of such
commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportion-
ally equal terms." § 13 (e). (Italics added.)
1954]
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"alternative type of promotional service or facility which is of equivalent
measurable cost ' 26 may be substituted in its place.
It could be argued with some merit that the same type of policy rules
should apply to other industries inasmuch as their problems, in part,
are not unlike those in the Cosmetic Industry.
Although the Commission and the courts have indirectly approved
only one interpretation of the phrase "proportionally equal terms," this
is by no means the only ratio that would be valid under the Act. The
real hope of the phrase lies not in its ambiguous past nor its equally
uncertain present but in future liberal constructions which the judicial
and administrative bodies must, of necessity, place upon it.
EDWIN S. PRESTON, JR.
Criminal Law-Former jeopardy-Discharge of jury Held to
Bar Subsequent Prosecution
Defendant was on trial for murder. At the end of the third day of
the trial the jurors were taken to a local hotel for the night. During the
night, the police, upon being called to investigate the conduct of the
jurors, found three in an intoxicated condition. When court was con-
vened the next day, in the absence of the jury and upon the testimony
of the officers, the judge withdrew a juror and declared a mistrial. The
defendant objected to the order of mistrial, and upon the court's over-
ruling the objection, duly excepted. At a later trial the defendant was
convicted of manslaughter, the court overruling a plea of former jeop-
ardy, to which the defendant duly excepted. On appeal, the Supreme
Court in a unanimous decision vacated the judgment, held the order of
mistrial improper and sustained the defendant's plea of former jeopardy1
The principle that a person shall not be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense is deeply rooted in American jurisprudence. 2 It is well
established that jeopardy attaches when a competent jury is sworn
"8 See note 23, supra.
State v. Crocker, 239 N. C. 446, 80 S. E. 2d 243 (1954). The city police
officers testified that they observed three jurors moving along the halls of the hotel
in an intoxicated condition. The sheriff testified that he observed one of the jurors
in an intoxicated condition either from alcoholic beverages or narcotic drugs, and
had to threaten arrest before the juror would become quiet and re-enter his room.
2 The Federal Constitution and all of the state constitutions, except the Consti-
tutions of Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Vermont,
contain prohibitions against double jeopardy. The states that do not have a con-
stitutional provision have the principle as a part of their common law. State v.
Benham, 7 Conn. 414 (1829) ; Gilpin v. State, 142 Md. 464, 121 Atl. 354 (1923) ;
Commonwealth v. McCan, 277 Mass. 199, 178 N. E. 633 (1931) ; State v. Clem-
mons, 207 N. C. 276, 176 S. E. 760 (1934) ; State v. O'Brien, 106 Vt. 97, 170 Atl.
98 (1934). See A. I. L., Administration of the Criminal Law, Commentary to § 6
(Proposed final draft for 1935) for a complete listing of the Constitutional pro-
visions.
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